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 ABSTRACT 
 
Although silence is certainly not what comes to mind first when considering the vast 
archive of critical research on postwar Pacific Rim relations, this thesis argues that it 
should be. By widening interpretations of collective memory and revisiting questions 
of the authenticity and completeness of historical records, I bring to the forefront 
perspectives of those who were silenced in the aftermath of the Asia-Pacific War. 
Such instances of silence—both imposed and self-inflicted—are examined in the 
following interrogations of: 1) the Tokyo Trial; 2) state control of (trans)national 
bodies through the aestheticization of war death; and 3) Japan’s fractured national 
identity as a result of the roles played both actively and passively by (trans)national 
subjects. Silence as historical amnesia, erasure, denial, revisionism, and/or shame 
touches the stories of all people affected throughout this era of conflicting 
imperialisms. In the wake of the 20th century’s violence, this paper points out which 
memory spaces have been forced to habituate these types of silence in the process of 
the un-making of the Japanese Empire, and intends to reclaim responsibility for an 
unethically attained postwar prosperity. 
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 In much the same way as I discuss the intergenerational atmosphere of guilt 
experienced in Post-War Japan, and in the way that foreign others like the comfort 
women and forced laborers feel wronged and silenced even within their own countries, 
I also want to include my own family’s history in this search for unobstructed 
memories and transnational reconciliation. The following account has served as my 
main inspiration for studying about postwar structural violence and the conflicts of 
collective memory in the Asia-Pacific for the past ten years.  
 My grandfather, William H. Durand, was both an unknowing victim and 
undeniable perpetrator of war violence. Asked to abandon his professorship at the 
University of Omaha to work as an engineer for the Martin Bomber plant in nearby 
Bellevue, Nebraska near the end of WWII, he became involved in a particular 
aeronautics project. Unbeknownst to him and his fellow engineers at the time, the 
designs being made by their team would eventually be implemented on the payload 
carrying section of the Boeing B-29 Superfortress bomber later named the Enola 
Gay—the aircraft that dropped the world’s first atomic bomb, which devastated the 
city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Several months before the project’s deadline, 
my grandfather recalled his sudden realization that this project, which from the start 
had been clouded in ambiguity, was likely headed for something far more nefarious 
than he initially imagined. With great dread he walked away from the job that morning 
and tried never to look back.  
 Our family first learned of his story only several years before his passing in 
2010 while he was in the process of writing his autobiography. After more than 60 
years of silence (partially induced by shame and partially by the social pressures of 
life in the conservative American Midwest), he shared with us his unforgettable guilt, 
as well as a confession that he had felt so traumatized that all details beyond the brief 
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explanation above felt as if they had been wiped from his memory—a sentiment 
uncannily mirrored by a number of former Japanese soldiers who came forth to share 
their memories with history long after the fact.1   
 Several years later, I found myself best of friends with an exchange student, 
Sayuri Harano, a native of Hiroshima whose grandparents had lived through and 
remembered the events of the Atomic Bombings. After a brief conversation about an 
upcoming university exchange trip to Hiroshima and the itinerary to visit the Peace 
and Memorial Park, I remembered the day my grandfather told us about his 
involvement with the Enola Gay and felt compelled to share with her. Numerous times 
after that we found ourselves in deep discussions over events from a war that neither 
of us remembered or knew much about, but both felt an indescribable connection over. 
Resigned to the idea that fate must have crossed our paths for a purpose, I have since 
felt determined to do what I can to acknowledge that tragedy and take the most ethical 
and reparative steps I can during my life: on an academic level by studying and 
critiquing the current archive of knowledge and those who control it, and on a personal 
level by building open and honest friendships with Sayuri and the many other 
international friends who I came to know in the process of this research.  
 I would like to thank Cornell University’s East Asia Program for their 
generous research travel grant that allowed me to conduct field research in Japan over 
the summer of 2018. My advisors, Professor Jane-Marie Law and Professor John 
Whitman, also deserve my utmost thanks for their patience and understanding of the 
personal and financial hurdles that long kept this paper from completion. Their 
thoughtful suggestions and encouraging remarks throughout this process helped keep 
                                                
1 These memories are addressed by feminist scholar and cinematographer Byun Young-joo in her 1997 
documentary, “Habitual Sadness,” to which the title of my thesis is part homage and part response. It is 
the second part of her trilogy on the past and present lives of comfort women that also includes, “The 
Murmuring” (1995), and “My Own Breathing” (1999). The trilogy’s Korean title is “낮은 목소리” 
(Low Voice). 
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me from being overwhelmed by the weight of my own topic. And of course, I am 
grateful to my parents for their endless compassion and optimism, and to Jeong who 
not only contributed a much-needed diversity of perspective to my analysis, but also 
spent every late night studying in solidarity with me.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Given the title of this paper, it might initially seem questionable how silence of 
any magnitude could exist within the discourse of one of the most well researched and 
hotly debated wars in world history. Although there already exists a diverse archive of 
research insightfully and critically evaluating what became of international relations 
during and after the Second World War, I resolved to write on the topic from the 
perspective of those who were silenced by those relations, rather than from the 
perspective of those who already had their say. Such instances of silence—both 
imposed and self-inflicted—can be discovered through interrogating the lens of 
collective memory and asking the hard questions about history that no one wants to 
ask: What was the cause? Who is responsible? What are we allowed to remember?  
 Like many authors of the sources I read in researching this topic—Hiro Saito, 
Yukiko Koga, Lisa Yoneyama, and Akiko Takenaka, to name a few—I find myself at 
once removed from any direct memory of the atrocities of that time and unable to 
move on from or ignore the burden I feel constantly at the back of my mind as a 
descendant of a directly involved party in these matters. Though I may not be a 
silenced voice myself, I am still here as a legacy of the 20th century, living in this 
international, cosmopolitan, and prosperous world that was won at the cost of 
immeasurable suffering, and I seek a way to a responsible future.  
 With this in mind, I locate the following thesis predominately in the fields of 
Transpacific Studies and Post-War Memory Studies with emphasis on war 
commemoration practices and state control of national and transnational bodies. 
Incorporating the critical strategies of Transpacific studies, I discuss the evolution of 
commemoration practices from pre-war Japan through the post-war era, and how they 
contributed to the traumatic and often suppressed memories that relentlessly haunt 
Asia-Pacific relations and leave the region in a state of unending postwar. I take 
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account of both official and original memories of the war, as well as national and 
transnational subjects’ individual and collective roles in it.  
 In interrogating topics ranging from the Imperial Japanese state’s 
aestheticization of war death2 to its fractured national identity incurred through the 
Tokyo Trial3, I explain the root causes of Japan’s current entrenchment in matters of 
postwar redress4 while also complicating the dichotomy of Japan’s victim mindset 
versus its aggressor reputation.5 By pointing out memory spaces that were absented in 
the process of the un-making of the Japanese Empire6 at the end of the Asia-Pacific 
War, we can observe how Western countries’ roles have been masked or downplayed 
as well as bring to light how the hasty pursuit of immediate postwar prosperity was 
paid for with the silence of many.7 
 A key point that stood out to me on the topic of commemoration was that it is 
simultaneously an act of the collective and of the individual8, and not always defined 
by such clear boundaries. I mean to say that learning about the past and deciding how 
to remember it should not be a passive, absorptive, or state-mandated activity. We are 
each entitled to our own memories, but so are all others whose paths we inevitably 
cross. The so-called “memory wars” in the Asia Pacific exist as a result of an apathetic 
public, oppressive societal sensitivities, and defensive and gendered nationalist 
                                                
2 Akiko Takenaka, Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar. Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2015. Kindle.  
3 Madoka Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the 
Nuremburg Legacy. London: Routledge, 2008. 
4 Lisa Yoneyama, Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War 
Crimes. Durham: Duke University Press, 2016.  
5 Hagström, Linus and Ulv Hanssen. “The North Korean Abduction Issue: Emotions, Securitisation and 
the Reconstruction of Japanese Identity from ‘Aggressor’ to ‘Victim’ and from ‘Pacifist’ to ‘Normal’.” 
The Pacific Review 28, no. 1 (Oct. 2014): 71-93. 
6 Yukiko Koga, “Between the Law: The Unmaking of Empire and Law’s Imperial Amnesia.” Law & 
Social Inquiry 41, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 402-424. 
7 Yukiko Koga, “Accounting for Silence: Inheritance, Debt, and the Moral Economy of Legal Redress 
in China and Japan.” American Ethnologist 40, no. 3 (2013): 494-507. 
8 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. by Lewis A. Coser. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992. 
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traditions that try to erase spaces for certain experiences to be remembered. This paper 
serves as a reminder to be cognizant of two main ideas: 1) that the uncomfortable 
truths and complexities of history do not always stop at generational, national, or 
personally remembered borders, and 2) that the relationship between war 
responsibility and political expediency shows that those who write history are not 
always the ones who lived it. 
 
CLARIFICATION OF TERMINOLOGY 
 As this paper necessarily makes reference to a variety of time periods, regions, 
and actors in discussing Japan’s history problems, some being more loosely defined 
than others, it is necessary to clarify the boundaries I intend to assign to their namings. 
For instance, “the Asia-Pacific War”9 is preferable to “the Greater East Asia War” due 
to the latter’s Imperial connotation and exclusion of the South and Southeast Asian 
theaters that were also involved in the wars of that era.10 I also prefer it to the general 
use of “The Second World War” in hopes of deterring emphasis on the European 
theater and its distantly related outcomes in the overlapping timeframe. This is not to 
say events in the European and Asia-Pacific theaters were unrelated, but to indicate 
that drawing conclusions or formulating solutions purely based on European models 
should be avoided. Specificities in regional events and cultural practices render such 
side-by-side comparison of the two regions both impractical and reckless. As I will 
                                                
9 I demarcate this period as roughly 1931 to 1945. This encompasses the Mukden Incident (September 
18, 1931), the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), and the Second World War (1939-1945). Hiro 
Saito (2016) also utilizes this breakdown. 
10 Although this paper focuses primarily on Japanese, Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean Peninsula 
relations in the Post-Cold War period, it is important to remember that as much as we see progress in 
un-“othering” the East Asian former colonial subjects in discussions of Imperial Japan’s legacy, there 
are still the South and Southeast Asian “others” who have yet to reach this step. Due to the scope of this 
paper, I limit myself to direct research of East Asian relations (with which I am more familiar), but 
wholeheartedly support that similar efforts be taken toward reconciling the individual grievances and 
memory disputes between the Japanese and the South and Southeast Asian victims.  
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mention in the next section, the legacy created by the Nuremberg Trial in short order 
proved to be critically problematic at the Tokyo Trial in precisely such a way.  
  Although use of “the Asia-Pacific War” admittedly risks somewhat de-
emphasizing the Korean perspective,11 I will do my best to refer to that situation 
separately when relevant, but also inclusively when using the broader term “the Asia-
Pacific War.” This uniquely long and troublesome history between Japan and the 
Koreas (especially South Korea) thus demands special attention and must not be 
forgotten throughout the following discussions of how Japan has come to remember 
the region’s war-torn past. 
 As for the time period following the unconditional surrender by Japan on 
August 15, 1945, “the Post-War era” is commonly used, technically encompassing any 
or all years since 1945.12 For the sake of segmenting those 70 odd years, I will refer to 
the “Cold War” years as 1946-199113, and to the following years as the “Post-Cold 
War.” I find “Post-Cold War” a particularly useful phrase as opposed to just “recent 
decades” or “since the 1990s” as it recognizes the significantly changed world order 
that resulted from the Cold War. Invoking scholar Lisa Yoneyama’s apt phrasing, the 
Post-Cold war era in which Asian history’s painful loose ends now linger, is 
effectively built on “Cold War Ruins.”14 
                                                
11 The country of Joseon was colonized and oppressively ruled by the Empire of Japan from 1910 to 
1945. The de-emphasis of the Korean perspective in using “the Asia-Pacific War” is an important point 
discussed further by Hiro Saito in his book, “The History Problem” (165-173). 
12 For example, scholar Akiko Takenaka considers Japan to be in a state of unending postwar, while 
scholar Peter Frost bounds postwar Japan between 1945 and 1989, marking the death of Emperor 
Hirohito as the symbolic end of Imperial Japan. His interpretation signals that the Japan of Heisei 
onward is a separate entity from that which it had formerly been. I favor Takenaka’s view as it 
encompasses the continuity of Japanese collective memory and explains its relationship to ongoing 
regional events. 
13 This further breaking down into other relevant East Asian conflicts: the Korean War years, 1950-
1953; and the Vietnam War years, 1955-1975. 
14 Yoneyama gives rich meaning to this term in her discussion of redress culture in East Asia from the 
1990s onward in her book also titled “Cold War Ruins.” 
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 The fields of memory studies and transpacific studies are doing much of the 
work of tying up these loose ends. However, despite the inclusive connotation of the 
term “memory studies,” significant conflict does exist within the field. For the 
purposes of this paper, “collective memory” will be used in line with scholar Jeffrey 
Olick’s sense of the phrase—that it be used as a “sensitizing term for a wide array of 
mnemonic processes, practices, and outcomes, neurological, cognitive, personal, 
aggregated, and collective,”15 rather than to set boundaries between particular groups’ 
claimed memories as if they have no choice but to be in a state of perpetual 
competition. He makes the point of comparing the determiners “collected” with 
“collective” and expresses that the social aspects of both are important. On one hand, 
while memories may belong to an individual, they were created in some sort of social 
context, thereby linking that memory to others. On the other hand, certain types of 
memories that have become dominant within a group over time may no longer be 
reducible back down to the individual level, as individuals within the group may have 
had varied initial experiences that led them to the conclusion the group happens to 
hold. For these reasons, Olick’s “collective memory” will prove most useful for the 
purposes of this paper. 
 The phrase is not left wide open for lack of academic direction, but rather to 
purposefully absorb input from a variety of disciplines and methodologies. So in 
addressing this tangle of individual, local, national, and supranational memories in 
regard to postwar redress culture in the Asia Pacific, the simultaneous existence of 
overlapping and competing memories must be accepted. A second acknowledgement 
must also come in the form of realizing that traumatic historical memory does not 
disappear with the death of the last survivor, witness, or relative—as Bauman states 
                                                
15 Olick, Jeffrey. “Collective Memory: The Two Cultures.” Sociological Theory 17, no. 3 (Nov. 1999): 
346-347. 
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about Auschwitz, it remains a trauma for the narratives of modernity and morality 
(1989).16 The current state of affairs between Japan and its neighboring countries is 
becoming another such case.  
 Geographical naming issues also arise—to whom do we really refer when we 
write or read “Japan” in papers on war memorialization? Surely we should no longer 
accept the reification of the various identities such as victim, perpetrator, conspirator, 
bystander, protestor, government official, foreign national, or individual under the 
comprehensive and more familiar word “Japan” in such a sensitive case. I attempt to 
overcome this lingering academic bad habit of ambiguity by clarifying at all times the 
directly relevant parties in each event discussed. However tedious to the reader and 
author, this duty is one in the same with the duty of remembering. 
  Another similar problem is how to address “Korea.” For example, when 
discussing victims of colonial trauma and war-related traumas in general on the 
Korean peninsula, it would be inappropriate to use the labels North or South when 
describing incidents prior to the political division in 1945. However, when speaking of 
more recent public actions taken by individuals or groups, it would be considerate to 
note that given the relative freedom of speech south of the 38th parallel, testimonies, 
media, and academic coverage we have access to is primarily provided by South 
Koreans.17  
 Due to recent controversies over the making (and attempted un-making) of 
political agreements between the Abe administration and South Korean presidencies 
over the past five years,18 utilizing the national labels of North and South becomes 
                                                
16 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. 
17 In the absence of accessible testimony from former comfort women whose fate led them to a life in 
the North, I wish also to acknowledge their yet untold suffering. Like various other women’s 
movements, a desire to help women on a certain topic should mean a desire to help all women on that 
same topic. 
18 Former President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo made a monumental “final 
settlement” in 2015, much to the dismay of comfort women and their actual support networks. As of the 
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unavoidable. When discussing the possible consequences of state-sponsored actions 
such as those, it is unfortunately necessary to consider that recent calls for a “final” act 
of apology/reparation from Japan have glossed over the fact that providing such things 
to survivors only in South Korea would leave other Korean victims in an 
unredressable state—allowing them to slip through the cracks for the sake of political 
expediency.19  
 For example, lets consider Abe’s continued sentiments regarding the 
irreversibility of the controversial 2015 agreement that demanded an end to South 
Korean diplomats’ continuing to bring up the comfort women ever again. At such a 
time in the future when North Korean former comfort women, forced laborers, or their 
families obtain the means to call for their own half of that justice, South Koreans 
would be prevented from assisting them in any official capacity. Such performances 
and allowances of this sort of “politics of regret”20 make a mockery of human rights as 
a concept and further showcase the shortsightedness of leaders in the region. This 
political climate should force us to question how decisions regarding official state-
sponsored redress of victims of human rights violations are made—How can they not 
include the sentiments of the victims themselves in their formulation?  
 To further reiterate the necessity of sensitizing naming practices and 
terminology use, we also come upon the problem of clarifying who the victims are, 
and by proxy, which victims have been deemed to matter. In response to persistent 
negative press coverage by major newspapers—especially The Yomiuri Shimbun, 
                                                                                                                                       
time of writing this paper, President Moon Jae-in warns Abe that nullifying the 2015 agreement is very 
possible. Motivations of both presidents are still murky at best. For reference see: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/world/asia/south-korea-japan-sex-slaves.html 
19 This does not even begin to cover the obstacles faced domestically by Korean survivors. For more on 
this domestic silencing of comfort women’s pasts, see: Yi, Joseph. “Confronting Korea’s Censored 
Discourse on Comfort Women.” The Diplomat, January 31, 2018. Also Lévy (2014) and Getz (2018). 
20 Jeffrey Olick, The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility. New 
York: Routledge, 2007. Kindle. 
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which continues to twist the experiences of the comfort women into a narrative of sex-
work-by-choice—scholar Muta Kazue makes a striking point about embedded 
attitudes of gendered violence that continue to pervade modern Japanese society:  
 
It is clear that these attitudes lack appropriate understanding of 
sexual violence and human rights. What can also be seen in this thinking 
is the idea of good women and bad women, in other words, the 
bifurcation of women. As long as the women had been paid, irrespective 
of coercion or deception, they were prostitutes, bad women, who were 
not entitled to human rights or an apology from the government. A right-
winger and famous manga artist, Kobayashi Yoshinori, a prominent 
figure especially among Japanese youth, writes that if a woman were 
respectable enough, she would not go public and say that she was a 
comfort woman, because she should be ashamed of her past (Kobayashi, 
1997). In this reasoning, vocal survivors are ‘dirty’ women by definition, 
and dirty women should never be entitled to human rights and dignity. 
Regrettably, he is not exceptional in this, as this kind of bifurcation 
permeates Japanese society.21 
 Later in her article, Muta goes on to back up this assessment with the 
revelation that even the legal system, the system any citizen looks to for justice, is full 
of structural violence against not just foreign women, but also Japanese women. For 
instance, take the Japanese penal code on rape, which has not undergone revision since 
its creation in 1907.22 Or the sad fact that rape cases are exceedingly underreported (1 
in 13 women has experienced sex against her will, but 68% never seek help or report 
the incident); or that male judges in cases as recent as 2011 overruled several rape 
victims’ testimonies on the basis of their not having attempted to escape or call for 
help. The Ministry of Justice even brushed aside CEDAW23 demands for “Promotion 
                                                
21 Kazue Muta, “The ‘Comfort Women’ Issue and the Embedded Culture of Sexual Violence in 
Contemporary Japan.” Current Sociology Monograph 64, no. 4 (2016): 620-636. 
22 We should ask why items like this legal instrument have not gotten swept up by the otherwise 
powerful wave of revisionism in Japan.  
23 The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is an 
international treaty adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 and has been ratified by 189 states, 
including Japan (but interestingly not the United States). http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ 
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of Measures against Sex Crimes (Rape and Forcible Indecency)” with a sentence 
saying they will “study the matter.”  
 Certainly the list goes on, but the point is that we cannot expect results when 
the system of law in Japan does not take sexual crimes and gendered violence 
seriously. Being able to name what constitutes a crime is a basic requirement for being 
able to identify who is a victim. Description of the extent of protection from said 
crime becomes the basis on which the public is made to see and believe which victims 
are the ones that matter. Absenting these clarifications is what forms the largest roots 
in this rhizome of social memory and historical redress problems in Post-Cold War 
Pacific Rim relations, and silences voices that must remain unheard in the pursuit of 
an ethical Post-War world. Just as any habit can be hard to break, silence in the face of 
injustice, whether intentional or imposed, is a form of habitual structural violence24 
that necessitates unrelenting interrogation. 
 
BACKDROP OF INJUSTICE 
 The central argument synthesizing the bundle of fomenting bilateral relations 
between the Japanese government and the governments of neighboring countries can 
be stated as simply as this: “We as a people have been treated unjustly.” This 
complaint, founded and reasonable, is actually far more multidirectional than it 
appears in media representations made for the general public. For years, a general but 
still insufficient focus has been given to the once colonized, war-torn neighboring 
countries like the Koreas and China, who suffered at the hands of Japanese 
Imperialists, but until recently hardly any attention has been paid to the role of 
imperialism exerted by Western countries through their self-justifying socio-political 
                                                
24 Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 
167-191. 
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practices. In the same way, bilateral discussions are, at a critical point, self-limiting; 
bringing to the diplomatic and academic tables concern only for issues bounded by 
national borders is no longer enough to beget progress. This section attempts to 
recount some key historiographical events that now loom behind discussions of 
moving past those old regional traumas, and reasons that discussions of redress ought 
not to always be contained within a single national or single bilateral discourse. 
 To talk about any sort of current events relating to the lasting tensions 
involving the Japanese government, we have to include the details of what catalyzed 
those detested imperial relationships of the past. One place to trace the roots of Japan’s 
old imperial origin is the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854. After roughly two 
centuries under the Sakoku Policy,25 the Edo period drew to a fitful close as the 
country was forcibly opened to the world under Commodore Perry and the U.S. 
government’s threat. By fourteen years later, a new government had risen out of the 
Meiji Restoration and began to consider that the country’s prior hermit status may 
have left society comparatively behind the times. Soon new social programs were 
implemented as tactics to alleviate that perceived need to play catch-up; delegations of 
students and a variety of researchers were sent around the world to absorb the Western 
arts and sciences, and upon their return, they contributed this accumulation of different 
knowledge and experience toward the internal forces that were already working to 
transform Japan from a feudal society into the successful industrial state it was starting 
to become.26  
 However, this effort did not merely stop at intellectual and industrial “catching 
up.” Although we may colloquially refer in awe to Japan as a country that 
                                                
25 (Seclusion 鎖国/쇄국) Totman, Conrad. “From Sakoku to Kaikoku: The Transformation of Foreign-
Policy Attitudes, 1853-1868.” Monumenta Nipponica 35, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 1-19. 
26 Beasley, William. The Meiji Restoration. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972. Kindle. 
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accomplished 200 years of modernization in a single generation, those drastic changes 
could not come without consequences. The First Sino-Japanese War (July 1894 – 
April 1895) erupted out of The Qing Dynasty’s and the Empire of Japan’s desire for 
influence over Korea.27 A clear shift in the balance of international power away from 
China and toward Japan for the first time in history resulted from Japan’s superior 
military modernization compared to that of the Qing by that time—the Qing could but 
resort to suing for peace in the face of such might.28   
 In addition to this realization of firepower inferiority, the loss of Korea as a 
tributary state became another catalyst for social uprisings in China, generally thought 
to have culminated in the Xinhai Rebellion of 1911.29 Taking into consideration their 
recent success against China, the growing chaos and disorganization in Russian 
society became another opportunity for the Empire of Japan to compete and win to 
solidify influence over Korea and also Manchuria. The Russo-Japanese War (Feb. 
1904 – Sept. 1905) again brought fighting near to Korea.30 With two such victories in 
short succession, it is no wonder that Japanese military leaders, politicians, and to 
some degree the citizenry, found themselves with increasingly patriotic and imperialist 
thoughts and desires. From this time and escalating consistently onward through the 
Asia-Pacific War, the Empire of Japan truly ventured to give meaning to the name Dai 
Nihon Teikoku.31  
 So far, this overview could be seen as just a recounting of normal war-making 
and state-making activities, but it is exactly this view that is problematic. Simply 
fighting over territory and resources is certainly not an issue that has diminished in our 
so-called modern times. However, looking at the periodically escalating tensions over 
                                                
27 It is notable that this war was fought mainly on Korean soil. 
28 http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1900_power.htm 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. 
31大日本帝國  / 대일본제국  / The Great Empire of Japan 
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the Senkaku/Diaoyu and Dokdo/Takeshima islands, for instance, have been portrayed 
as huge red flags of dangerous nationalism brewing. For whatever reason, these 
current events are portrayed not merely as matters of saber-rattling and calls for 
increased military involvement, but also as issues to invoke fear of a widespread 
underlying societal unrest.  
 Although some scholars claim it is wrong to utilize the lens through which we 
see things in our own present time as a way to look at the past, in the instance of 
looking at not only such territorial disputes but also related transnational memory wars, 
doing so may be warranted. In other words, through the lens of calling out nationalism 
and imperialism after having gained hindsight of their dangerous potential, what 
should prevent a concerned researcher from turning that same lens backward onto the 
past to assess the process of “the un-making of empire”32 in the Post-Asia Pacific War 
context? The point would not be to place blame on prior generations—we have 
acquired the experience to see things this way, after all—but to reason out why the 
region’s redress diplomacy has grown so entrenched. Though there is no way to 
remake the past, I suggest we might overlay its original stories with the critical 
knowledge of nationalism, imperialism, and colonialism we have gained at its price. 
 
THE TOKYO TRIAL 
 For now, let us move beyond the well-hashed events of the First and Second 
World Wars to the months immediately following Emperor Hirohito’s unconditional 
surrender on August 15, 1945. At that juncture, one memory site in particular—that of 
the Tokyo Trial—swiftly became and has since remained at the center of debate about 
Japanese war responsibility. However, despite voluminous writing (not all of it equally 
accessible) on the proceedings and their outcomes, ordinary citizens in both Japan and 
                                                
32 Koga, 2016. 
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the international community still seem to lack a constructive understanding of the 
event. For many the trial seems an event of the distant past, and what we as 
individuals can or should have to do with it now is even less clear. This question is 
addressed in fascinating detail in historian Herbet P. Bix’s book, “Hirohito and the 
Making of Modern Japan,” from which much of the following section was informed.  
 Reiterating the importance of naming within this paper, let us first address the 
formal title of the Tokyo Trial: the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE). The Tokyo Trial does seem the far more apt moniker as the “Far East” was 
effectively forgotten in the proceedings, and “International” may as well have been 
replaced with “American.” Even calling it a “trial” is pushing it, but it is true that the 
event did take place in Tokyo and for a long time appeared, at least to those who were 
fed a certain narrative, to have been a perfectly acceptable method for wrapping up the 
end of the war. For a second extensive reading on the Tokyo Trial, legal scholar 
Madoka Futamura’s book, “War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The 
Tokyo Trial and the Nuremberg Legacy” is crucial, but there are two particular points 
very worth extracting here.  
 First is regarding the efficacy of international war crimes tribunals in general—
What exactly is achieved when foreign powers step in to prosecute suspected war 
criminals? In the murky arena of international law and justice, the idea behind these 
types of trials is that they are to achieve peace in the immediate aftermath of armed 
conflict. However, the definitions of peace and justice become far too blurred in such 
an event—the founded belief that the Tokyo Trial is an example of victor’s justice33 
comes from this elision of concepts.34 Just think for a moment; would you 
immediately feel more inclined to be peaceful toward former enemies if they suddenly 
                                                
33 However, to say that the Tokyo Trial was a case of only victor’s justice would be to paint an 
incomplete picture. On page 16, Emperor Hirohito’s complicit role is addressed. 
34 Futamura, 2008. pp. 16-29.  
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occupy your homeland, declare that they will harshly judge the actions of your leaders 
to root out some terrible evil, and afterward keep most of the details to themselves and 
never really return from whence they came? Aside from utilitarian backlash to that 
statement which would claim international ethical standards were breached and that an 
international tribunal was unavoidable because corrupt military leaders needed to be 
immediately removed from power, the idea that military tribunals exist to exact peace 
is farcical.      
 Futamura’s second damning point is that when looking at the original Japanese 
language records of the trial, we face a dilemma of relative accessibility. The tribunal 
did have the stenographic record in Japanese published, however, it seems the 
originals were not widely circulated. We can now find only its 1968 reproduction.35 
While the Asahi Shimbun newspaper’s court staff also published nine volumes of their 
own records during the time of the trials (1946-1948),36 there was no official state-
sponsored publication. In comparison with the forty-two volumes of documentation 
given in evidence, their indexes, and the stenographic records in four languages 
published for the Nuremberg Trial, the difference is clear.37 
 Without forgetting our critical mind toward imperialism, we should note that 
the CIA’s Foreign Documents branch had the vast majority of physical records of the 
Tokyo Trial removed from Japan upon the trial’s completion.38 The accompanying 
lack of general knowledge or memory of this trial’s existence and outcomes by 
ordinary Japanese citizens and the transpacific community is in stark contrast with that 
                                                
35 Futamura, p. 10. 
36 The staff reported that was very difficult to take printed materials out of the courtroom at that time—
presumably due to restrictions set by the Occupation forces. Additionally, stenographic records in 
English stopped being distributed to news agencies in Japan partway through the trial as a purported 
relief measure on the U.S. taxpayers who had been paying for the paper used in the trial. Asahi 
Shimbunsha Chosa Kenkyushitsu (1953) pp. 3-4. 
37 Futamura, p. 9. 
38 Futamura, pp. 24-26. 
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of the so-called Nuremberg Legacy. Although created for the same purpose—to “bring 
peace through justice to the vanquished of WWII for their war crimes” 39—and often 
lumped together in discussions of history and law as if totally similar, just with 
Nuremberg happening to be the better recorded of the two, we begin see a curious trail 
of breadcrumbs pointing toward erased injustices at the Tokyo Trial.  
 Bernard Röling, the Dutch justice of the Tokyo Trial,40 in response to a 
question of the scarcity of trial documentation, recalled: 
 
I suppose that [the British and the Americans] were perhaps a bit 
ashamed of what happened there… I suspect they didn’t want the 
Tokyo Trial to become very well known. But I have no evidence for 
that. It’s just strange that the ‘biggest trial in recorded history’, as it has 
been called, was so over-looked.41 
 In fact, there is plenty of evidence. To further implicate this blatant erasure of 
U.S. imperialism, we need look no further than the preparations for the Tokyo Trial 
itself. To start, the occupation of Japan by U.S. forces was not simply a show of power 
or a monitoring system installed in place of the vanquished leadership. Rather, at the 
very top there was a general willingness to collaborate; Hirohito desired to preserve 
the kokutai and his position as Emperor while General MacArthur aimed to preserve 
the people’s attachment to the Emperor system in order to prevent social unrest. 
However, in the face of such a total defeat for Japan and the U.S.’s obsession with 
preventing the spread of communism, the only way to achieve such a working 
relationship between the former enemies was to construct a revised image of recent 
                                                
39 i.e. They are the only two military tribunals that were ever seen through to completion. 
40 Borch (2017). Röling’s comment is especially interesting considering that the Dutch were 
concurrently holding their own trials on war crimes in Indonesia (1946-1949), and on an even larger 
scale. More than 1000 Japanese soldiers and civilians, as well as a number of Dutch citizens who had 
collaborated with them, were tried. Roughly one quarter were executed, and only 6 were acquitted. The 
rest received varying sentences from less than five years to life. Borch, fluent in Dutch and with a 25-
year career as a military lawyer for the U.S. army, is one of the first to make available in English 
extensive writing on this topic. 
41 Futamura, p. 11. 
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historical events; one that would be palatable to the public both in Japan and the U.S.42 
 To put it in a simplified way, Hirohito was cast as a peace-minded emperor 
whose opinions had lacked enough influence to prevent the nation from becoming 
embroiled in a state of total war. Unable to prevent involvement, his hope to was then 
to make the best effort at victory, but when the inevitable defeat was at hand after the 
atomic bombs had been dropped, he generously strove to save the nation by accepting 
defeat. He soon quietly distanced himself from his closest advisors including his 
favorite Prime Minister, Tojo, and had prepared an historical account that would 
sacrifice them in order to preserve his own innocence and title. His compliance with 
GHQ and their efforts to democratize Japan were branded as the road to lasting peace 
Hirohito had imagined for his nation. While many Japanese noticed the contradictions 
of this story, the real weight of the occupation prevented deeper reflection and public 
discussion of the matter.43  
 This environment, constructed from the strength of the U.S.’s imperialist  
agenda and the shrewd political awareness and fear that was part of Hirohito’s 
character, were the enabling mechanisms for both the occupation in general and the 
Tokyo Trial in particular. At that time, the U.S. had three distinct political objectives 
that can be summarized as: 1) disarmament/ demilitarization of Japan, 2) prosecution 
of war criminals, and 3) democratization. This second task was specifically addressed 
in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on September 12, 1945, whereat 
policies being applied in Europe (e.g. Nuremberg) related to trying and punishing war 
criminals were deemed applicable for general use in dealing with the Far East. Also 
responsible is the Far Eastern Commission, a group commissioned to oversee the 
writing of the terms of surrender; they effectively placed the “American policy” on 
                                                
42 Bix, pp. 487-579. 
43 Bix, pp. 581-688. 
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war criminals at the center of the “Allied policy.”44 Therefore, support of the U.S. plan 
to try Japanese individuals45 in a military tribunal was solidified. Thus, although each 
judge assembled for the Tokyo Trial was from one of the nine signatory countries46 of 
the finalized Instrument of Surrender (plus one from India and one from the 
Philippines),47 the trial’s underlying framework dominated by U.S. policy was cleverly 
masked under the appearance of such an international assemblage.  
 Nuremberg set the example that individualization of responsibility and creation 
of an authoritative historical record are two key factors of helping a post-conflict 
society return to peace and normalcy. However, since the Tokyo Trial took place just 
six short months after the Nuremberg Trial, it is obvious that insufficient time had 
passed for the longer-term social outcomes of Nuremberg to be assessed. It was on this 
reckless basis that the U.S. imagined the Tokyo Trial as a fitting method for achieving 
immediate postwar change. The hope that the general public of Japan could be 
returned to a state of peace and be free to rid their society of the racist views raised to 
prominence by the top influential few was based on the superficial appearance that 
Nazism was quickly being excised from Europe thanks to Nuremberg. But ultimately, 
when we look at the Tokyo Trial we are forced to see that the top figure, Emperor 
Hirohito, was exempted from being tried. And it is from this point that we can tie the 
first and third U.S. political objectives (demilitarization and democratization) directly 
to the Tokyo Trial. 
 As mentioned above, the U.S. government desired a foothold in East Asian 
military, political, and economic affairs that would long outlast Japan’s temporary 
                                                
44 Futamura, p. 56. 
45 Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration states, “We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as 
a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those 
who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.” 
46 Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, and 
the United States. 
47 Futamura, p. 53. 
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occupation. They recognized the need to create a path that could allow for the 
construction of a completely new and closely cooperative relationship with Japan.48 Of 
course that could never be a simple task for two enemy countries full of people who 
had just spent many months in intense armed conflict. So, in order to be accepted by 
Japanese people as the military protector for the newly demilitarized Japanese state, it 
can be seen that the Emperor’s war guilt was purposely absented in his being spared 
from the Tokyo Trial as well as from nearly any form of media criticism in the years 
following.49  
 Despite the Emperor’s title as Supreme Commander of the war, by way of 
painting him as the puppet of military and political leaders as described in previous 
pages, the Tokyo Trial served to both restore the sore American psyche after the defeat 
at Pearl Harbor and preserve the Japanese people’s international respectability by 
trying 28 of the 80 suspected war criminals originally detained at Sugamo Prison in 
the Emperor’s stead. 
 This critical decision is instrumental in analyzing the both the claim of the U.S. 
exacting “victor’s justice” through the Tokyo Trial and the progress of Japanese 
people’s personal feelings of responsibility (or lack thereof) toward the war. By not 
trying the Emperor, his presumed innocence could then be passively internalized by 
the many Japanese people who had been mobilized for the war effort in his name.50 
Censorship of the press from both sides encouraged the initial amnesia of the war’s 
facts and effectively created the habit of denying war responsibility that the Japanese 
government still seems unable to break. For U.S. purposes, the Emperor was to be 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 Young-hwan Chong, “The Tokyo Trial and the Question of Colonial Responsibility: Zainichi Korean 
Reactions to Allied Justice in Occupied Japan.” International Journal of Korean History 22, no. 1 (Feb. 
2017): 77-105. And Bix, p. 619-688. 
50 Jemima Repo, “A Feminist Reading of Gender and National Memory at the Yasukuni Shrine.” Japan 
Forum 20, no. 2 (May 2008): 219-243. 
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taken down from divine status and made the human face of democratic ideals on 
which Japan could be reborn—for surely that would be hurdle enough for the recently 
occupied Japanese people to accept.  
 Futamura also found in her recent field research that interviewees still could 
not really separate discussions of war responsibility from the Emperor’s responsibility. 
Having come to accept the story that the military leaders deceived the Emperor, they 
too feel that they (or their elders) had been deceived. Knowing of this immunity 
granted to the Emperor precludes reflection by individual Japanese people on what 
war responsibility means. It also concatenates the unhelpful victim mindset stemming 
from the outcome of the Tokyo Trial with the undeniable and unique victim mindset 
resulting from being the only habited country on Earth to have experienced an Atomic 
bombing.51 This mindset silences the voices of non-Japanese victims by erasing the 
space in which they can be seen as victims that matter.  
 
A TROUBLED NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 Acknowledging this obfuscated U.S. imperialism makes visible a backdrop of 
particular injustices experienced by the Japanese people, but it also unfortunately 
complicates the broader picture of injustices experienced throughout the Asia Pacific. 
In order to avoid the Tokyo Trial’s mistake of erasing the space in which to hear out 
the voices of other war victims from the region, we can start by investigating the 
resultant fragility of Japanese national identity. This can help pinpoint the causes of 
several of the major longstanding transnational memory and redress disputes: namely 
the Yasukuni Shrine conundrum, constitutional revisionism, and historical amnesia 
regarding the suffering of “foreign others.” To generally outline the following section, 
                                                
51 Han, Dongyu. “An Analysis of Japan’s Interpretation of History over the Seven Postwar Decades.” 
Social Sciences in China 38, no. 3 (Jul. 2017): 47-64. 
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separation of religion and state, state control of national and transnational bodies, the 
creation of taboo via “historical amnesia,” and the cost of habitual silence will be 
addressed. I also include a brief overview of my field research in Tokyo during the 
summer of 2018. 
 
The Three “Yasukuni” 
 If there were one thing any average world-news-watcher could recall if asked 
about the “memory wars” in East Asia, it would almost certainly be some recent tidbit 
related to the Yasukuni Shrine. Similarly, despite having already been a major topic of 
discussion in the fields of Asian studies, political science, and history over the seven 
decades following the Asia Pacific War’s end,52 unraveling its complexities continues 
to take up a preponderance of researchers’ time and effort. Thus, this persistent 
collective interest (or furor) over “Yasukuni” makes it a prime target for my 
interrogation as well. However, rather than pick apart particular instances of current 
politically colored visits by officials, or which demonstrations have sprung up in their 
protest, I will focus on the ontological problems at the foundation of this so-called 
“conundrum.”  
 The general tendency to reify “Yasukuni” as some sort of singular actor that 
causes international relations between Japan and neighboring countries to crumble is 
problematic along the same lines as the naming practices I have taken issue with in the 
above sections. Even in Japanese language discourse and media we bump into the 
blanket phrase Yasukuni mondai,53 which could be taken in either the singular or 
plural sense. So again, I ask: What are we really talking about when we talk about 
“Yasukuni”?  
                                                
52 Sakamoto, Rumi. “Mobilizing Affect for Collective War Memory.” Cultural Studies 29, no. 2 (Mar. 
2014): 158-184. 
53 靖国問題 tr. Yasukuni Problem(s). I advocate considering this phrase in the plural.	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 Author Akiko Takenaka brings to light the utility of partially subdividing our 
consciousness of this term in the process of unraveling conflicting postwar memories 
in the Asia Pacific, so I adopt her strategy here. It involves locating the origin of a 
relevant “Yasukuni” topic within one of the three following components: Yasukuni the 
belief (Yasukuni shinkō), Yasukuni the site (Yasukuni Jinja), and Yasukuni the 
(social/political) issue (Yasukuni mondai),54 and then considering how that topic 
intertwines with the other components. She synthesizes broadly it in this way: 
 
The operators of “Yasukuni the site” are complicit in promoting 
“Yasukuni the belief” and therefore play a major role in intensifying 
“Yasukuni the issue.” 
Yasukuni the Site 
 To discuss these three aspects of Yasukuni as we see them today, it is useful to 
begin with the creation and evolution of Yasukuni the site. In 1869 at the start of the 
Meiji Restoration, new Imperial Advisor, Kido Takayoshi, noted after passing by the 
bustling Ueno area that it might prove a valuable location for a national memorial 
honoring the war dead; he may have been the first to plant the idea of what would later 
become the Yasukuni Shrine. At the same time, Imperial Minister of War, Omura 
Masujiro, had dreams for a similar project; however, he proposed a different site, one 
atop Kudan Hill, claiming enemy bakufu spirits of the recent rebellion would likely 
haunt Ueno. Kudan Hill overlooked Tokyo all the way to the bay and was in close 
proximity to the old Edo Castle, which would become the site of the new Imperial 
Palace. Omura, also known as the “Father” of the Imperial Japanese Army, mused that 
such a location might also serve a more strategic purpose should Japan become 
                                                
54 Akiko Takenaka, pp. 5-6, 靖国進行、靖国神社、靖国問題	 
In other words, we could sort this as: problems with religion, problems with physical location/symbolic 
meaning, and political problems. The translation of mondai in this case should be thought of it in the 
plural sense; i.e. there are a variety of politically oriented mondai connected with Yasukuni Shrine and 
it activities. 
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embroiled in any future armed disputes.55 It was with this prophetic mindset that both 
Yasukuni the site, and later Yasukuni the belief, were born. 
 As I just mentioned, the original intent for the site was to make it a national 
memorial for the war dead. While different places around the world all have their own 
traditions regarding war death, the practice that inspired activities at the Kudan Hill 
memorial site came from the Chōshu region, which was home to central actors of the 
Meiji Restoration. There the local Shinto practice of memorializing fallen Imperial 
loyalists had started around the late 1850s56 but soon was transformed into a national 
practice in 1862 when war dead from several adjacent regions were collectively 
enshrined in Kyoto, the former capital, for the first time. However, through this 
gradual process of collectivizing the memorialization of the war dead, discrepancies in 
local practices would be erased. One interesting thing to note is that in some domains, 
the war dead of both sides would be memorialized together, a trait noticeably absent 
from the collectivized version of this practice that is familiar to us now.57  
 Shortly after Tokyo was named the new capital in 1868, those spirits were 
transferred on government order to the aforementioned new memorial site at Kudan 
Hill, at the time under its first official name: Tokyo Shonkonsha.58 Constructed in just 
ten days during June of 1869, it was first comprised of just a few temporary structures, 
much like any other local memorial space. It was not until the completion of the 
permanent structures and the addition of the Yushukan (a war museum) that the site 
started to gain a more noticeable presence in the lives of Tokyoites. 
                                                
55 Takenaka, ch.1 “Mobilizing Death.” 
56 Takenaka, pp. 27. 
57 Takenaka, pp. 28 
58 Shokonsha, a place where a shokon ritual is performed. A shokon ritual is a type of death-related 
practice in Japan which serves to ritually placate recently passed spirits into accepting their death. It is 
believed that the spirits of the dead could linger on in the world of the living for some time, especially if 
they were confused or displeased about their death. See Jeffrey Richey, 2015. 
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 Interestingly, it was more for the sake of the surrounding novelties beginning 
to appear in the Kudan Hill area at around the same time that visitors started to 
populate the grounds of Tokyo Shokonsha. Local artists found inspiration from the 
picturesqueness of the grounds and their view of the bay while locals enjoyed 
entertainment at the festivals frequently operated there. The precincts quickly gained a 
reputation as a place of spectacle, thanks in part to Yushukan’s fantastical displays of 
wartime scenes, but also because they often played host to such events as horse races, 
sumo matches, and even circuses. This metropolitan atmosphere can be seen in the 
famous wood-block print by Yousai Nobukatsu (below). Note the vibrant clothing of 
the patrons as well as the central presence of Okuma Ujihiro’s 1893 Western-style 
bronze statue of Omura Masujiro—the first of its kind in Japan. From this depiction, 
we can see that at least initially, influential Tokyoites paid relatively little attention to 
the Shinto activities regarding the war dead and favored instead the novelties of 
Tokyo’s burst of urbanization.   
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 Amid this popularization of Tokyo Shokonsha (later Yasukuni the site), a large 
number of other smaller local memorials had also been constructed to honor fallen 
Imperial loyalists. In 1874 the government declared that all local memorials be 
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designated as shokonsha. This created a national network of sorts as they began 
receiving government financial support. The problem with the former Tokyo 
Shokonsha, however, was that the souls that had been transferred there as national 
heroes and as kami needed a more permanent residence; a shokonsha was meant to be 
only a temporary ritual space for the recently apotheosized war dead, not their long-
term residence. This was a function only a fully-fledged Shinto shrine could serve.  
 Originally, the Tokyo Shokonsha was not especially different or higher in 
status than the other memorials that had undergone nationalization. It was due to its 
close proximity to the Imperial Palace and the high foot traffic it generated that called 
attention to the value it could serve if it were to be transformed into a National Shinto 
Shrine. So, on June 4, 1879, amid the relative public apathy toward the function and 
status of Tokyo Shokonsha, Imperial Minister Sanjo Sanetomi issued a special 
directive that the site was to be designated as a Special Government Shrine (bekkaku 
kanpeisha) and be officially renamed “Yasukuni Shrine.”59 This move not only placed 
Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni the site) on a higher level within that national network of 
war memorials, but also served to institutionalize the use of Shinto war dead memorial 
practices for Imperial and military purposes.  
Yasukuni the Belief 
 In early modern Japan, it was not unusual for religion and entertainment to be 
closely related. When Buddhism had been the favored state religion, temples had often 
served as both religious spaces and entertainment facilities. This meeting of sacred and 
secular could coexist due to the construction of such activities as forms of ritual 
offering; and, for financial reasons, they often helped to keep regular temple activities 
possible.60 At the start of the Meiji Restoration, when Shinto came to be favored by 
                                                
59別格官幣社,  靖国神社 
60 Takenaka pp. 53-54 
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the Emperor and Imperial government,61 the same relationship followed for Shinto 
Shrines, especially Yasukuni.  
 As for the entertainment to be had at the Yushukan, which was installed on the 
Yasukuni Shrine grounds in 1882, visitors could experience an ever-growing range of 
vivid and glorified snapshots of what war was like far from home. While information 
on domestic conflicts was also made available there, a general focus was placed on 
international conflicts, especially as Japan’s modernized military strength began to 
surpass that of its neighbors. During the wars against China62 and Russia63 overviewed 
in the first section of this paper, Yushukan served as a base from which militarism and 
a sense of celebratory nationalism began to overshadow the perception of loss of life 
and mourning, therein obscuring the original purpose of Yasukuni Shrine, which was 
supposed to be the honorable memorialization of fallen soldiers.  
 Here is where we reach an important crux in the formation of the “Yasukuni 
Conundrum”: the passive reception by everyday Japanese people of the state ideology 
that aestheticized war death and silenced stories of suffering. While we cannot say that 
this was a case of unquestioning acceptance of news from the fronts, the social 
expectation that led many to celebratory participation in Shrine events allowed for a 
view of Japan’s ethno-national superiority to take root via the dissemination of 
Imperial messages voicing the benefits of expanding as an Empire. By way of 
everyday citizens’ physical participation in the spectacles at Yasukuni the site, 
Yasukuni the (state-sanctioned) belief came to permeate the popular/collective 
conscious.64  
                                                
61 For more details on the period of haibutsu kishaku  (廃仏毀釈) see Nam-lin Hur, Death and Social 
Order in Tokugawa Japan: Buddhism, Anti-Christianity, and the Danka System. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2007. 
62 1894-1895 
63 1904-1905, these two wars were reviewed in the historical background section. 
64 Takenaka pp. 52-54. 
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 Other than the lack of focus on memorialization, the reality of Yasukuni turned 
out just as Omura had originally predicted—that the central location of Kudan Hill 
could effectively serve as a place to strategically mobilize the nation in the face of 
military action. Particularly from the late 1930s and on through the end of the Asia-
Pacific War, more concrete traces of this mobilization became visible. Referred to in 
the Japanese context as “mobilizing death” by Akiko Takenaka,65 and similarly in the 
European context as the “Myth of the War Experience” by George Mosse,66 we can 
see the undeniable attempt to construct a higher meaning for war participation in films, 
literature, school curriculum, and a wide variety of other public media. In the face of 
mass death, the public was made to view war death as less a loss of life and more a 
form of glorious sacrifice followed by hallowed resurrection.  
 Such resurrection was exactly what Yasukuni the belief touted to those young 
recruits and their worried families primarily during the latter years of the Asia-Pacific 
War. Through the reinvention of the original Japanese term eirei67 within the context 
of Yasukuni the belief, military strategists were able to accomplish two things that 
would interminably affect Japanese national memory and identity. One was simply the 
provision of hope for an honorable resurrection of the spirit—totally cleansed of any 
wrongdoing potentially committed in life—for any individual who may die in the 
name of the Emperor. The other is the post-mortem transformation of those 
individuals into an irreversible collective.68  
                                                
65 Takenaka, ch. 1. 
66 Mosse, George. “Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience” Journal of Contemporary 
History 21, no. 1 (1986): 491-513. 
67 Takenaka, p. 91. Eirei is a term that originally meant something closer to venerable person and had 
no particular Shinto connotation. The term was used in its current context for the first time in the 
Yasukuni Jinjashi published in 1911.英霊	 	 
68 It is important to note here that a considerable number of non-Japanese bodies were also mobilized 
for total war in the name of Emperor Hirohito. For example, the families of Korean and Chinese men 
who had been forced into armed service during the war had no say in whether or not they wanted their 
family members to be enshrined at Yasukuni. In most cases, there was no way they could have been 
notified. Upon later discovering the fates of their sons and brothers, some families would vehemently 
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 While the first result is appealing in an obvious way, the second had to be 
packaged as an appealing eventuality. This was achieved by virtue of the fact that later 
in the war it had become nearly impossible to retrieve the bodies of the fallen from the 
distant battle theaters. Military leaders thus began to capitalize on the concept of eirei 
as a way to appease the izoku (bereaved families) who would fear their relative had 
been forced to die a bad death in a faraway land and would be prevented from ever 
resting in peace.69 While funerary practices in Japan generally placed emphasis on 
proper ritual involving the physical body,70 in the numerous cases that the military 
could not retrieve the bodies for these purposes,71 war death was made more tolerable 
via the aforementioned shokon rituals, which would call the faraway spirits of the eirei 
back home temporarily for their honorable enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine. However, 
in the process of enshrinement, the souls of the eirei are erased of individuality and are 
absorbed into the permanent entity that is believed to be the protective ancestor of 
Japan: the kami housed at Yasukuni Shrine.  
 This practice elevated otherwise normal citizens’ deaths to something roughly 
equivalent to nationalized ancestor worship and attempted to bestow on those left 
behind a pride and right to be respected in society. But understandably, many could 
not perform that ideal emotional response, as no amount of pride or gratitude could 
replace the time lost with a loved one in their eyes. In order to cement an image across 
the nation to those not present at the ceremonies but who would still be forced to give 
up their loved ones to the war effort through the conscription system, traces of 
                                                                                                                                       
request their removal from Yasukuni Shrine only to be told that it was an irreversible process. After 
Class-A, -B, and –C war criminals also came to be enshrined there in the 1970s, it should be 
understandable why the international furor and demands for change only continue to grow. 
69 Bad death meaning a belief that death without sufficient closure or proper recognition through ritual 
could result in the creation of a vengeful spirit. 
70 Nam-lin Hur, Death and Social Order in Tokugawa Japan: Buddhism, Anti-Christianity, and the 
Danka System. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007. 
71 This was the case particularly for deaths in the Chinese and South Pacific theaters. 
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negativity had to be actively filtered out. A memory of one NHK Radio announcer 
who conducted a live broadcast of a Yasukuni enshrinement ritual admitted to his 
corroboration in the literal silencing of his fellow citizens. He expressed regretfully 
that although he felt great emotional difficulty in following orders to muffle the voices 
of dispairing izoku in the audience while using his microphone during the broadcast, 
he found he could not physically act otherwise.72  
 Even for those who did speak out, there was little open support to be found. 
Respected but controversial political philosopher Yoshino Sakuzo73 released the 
following fiery critique of the concept of eirei in 1921: 
 
I know a fellow who, while working as a shop clerk, stole money and 
ran away. He later died at war and is now honored as a god at 
Yasukuni Shrine. This system, which allows anyone to become a god 
as long as he dies at war, whether he was a libertine or good-for-
nothing while alive, cannot be satisfactory for our ethical ideal.74 
Unsurprisingly, while many intellectuals concurred with this view, there was little 
mental/emotional space left in wartime Japanese society for everyday people to 
question how it could be possible that anyone, regardless of the accumulation of their 
lifetime of deeds, could become a god.  
 The institutionalization of grief exhibited through this replacing of sorrow and 
anguish with gratitude and pride became a self-reinforcing phenomena. Just as 
children were instructed in school to bow when passing any home that displayed the 
wooden plaque recognizing an eirei, adults were encouraged by the actions of their 
peers who had also lost family members to show respect and express gratitude to each 
other. This lead to an environment of mutual surveillance as one’s own comments had 
                                                
72 Takenaka, ch. 4 “Institutionalizing Grief.” 
73 Yoshino Sakuzo is noted for his criticism of Japan Leader Theory and also supported Korean 
Independence. Fujimura, Ichiro. “Toten Miyazaki and Sakuzo Yoshino: Thoughts on Asian Solidarity 
and Universalism in Pre-war Japan.” Asian Culture and History 9, no. 1 (Sept. 2016): 1-6. 
74 Takenaka, pp. 91-92. 
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the potential to either increase perceived patriotism and civic participation or express 
ingratitude toward the sacrifices of others. This was exacerbated by the fact that later 
in the war some would even be arrested for shows of public dissent.75 So from start to 
finish, Imperial military leaders were able to gain formidable control of all bodies in 
the nation, not just those affected by mandatory conscription. It was under this 
umbrella of state-censored media combined with the military’s control of national 
subjects’ bodies that Yasukuni the belief was solidified and Yasukuni the site was cast 
as the place at which the highest human honor a Japanese person could achieve could 
be bestowed. 
Yasukuni the Issue 
 Knowing all of this, let us re-evaluate the physical and symbolic existence of 
Yasukuni the site through the lens of Yasukuni the issue as it is seen today. In general, 
I believe outcry (i.e. Yasukuni the issue) sparked by events at Yasukuni the site—most 
notably the veiled process through which numerous Class-A, -B, and -C war criminals 
came to be enshrined at Yasukuni in the 1970s76—can be linked to certain 
expectations originally formed by the following two key postwar documents. The first 
is a policy issued by the General Headquarters called “the Directive for the 
Disestablishment of State Shinto” (December 15, 1945). According to the directive, by 
formally divesting Shinto shrines from any form of state financial or symbolic support, 
the U.S. Occupation forces hoped to divorce the Japanese people, especially young 
and impressionable school-aged children,77 from the social atmosphere that had 
                                                
75 Sadanobu Aoki, “Watashi no Yasukuni Jinja.” In his Buraun kan no shisō: Taishū sōsa no kōzu, 73–
88. Tokyo: Sekai Shisōsha, 1976. 
76 Mike Mochizuki, "The Yasukuni Shrine Conundrum: Japan's Contested Identity and Memory." 
Northeast Asia's Difficult Past: Essays in Collective Memory, eds. Barry Schwartz and Mikyoung Kim, 
(2010): 31-52.  
77 All public educational institutions were forbidden from including Shinto-related matters in their 
curriculum. For instance, class field trips to local shrines were forbidden, and all existing textbooks had 
to be censored of any mention of Shinto beliefs or stories.  
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 “deluded the Japanese people into embarking upon wars of aggression.”78  
 However, contrary to how this doctrine appears to be an exercise promoting a 
hardline ethics of Western-style democratic separation of religion and state, I believe 
what it actually created was an expectation, rather like a porous boundary, over which 
the sensitive question of how the defeated are allowed to remember their fallen 
comrades would come to be tested. In this way, Yasukuni the site, which had long 
enjoyed a status as the most prominent symbol of State Shinto, became a ground zero 
for the competing memories of a problematic war. The decades long reactionary 
attitude to this doctrine by Japanese leaders also indicates that Yasukuni the issue is 
not a problem that can be remedied by the simple destruction or repurposement of 
Yasukuni the site. What politicians (including the Emperor) say and do regarding 
Yasukuni the issue is to appropriate Yasukuni the site as a microphone through which 
Japan’s fragile national identity and conflicting memories as both aggressor and victim 
are made most uncomfortably and one-sidedly vocal.   
 The second document, or rather, speech, is Emperor Hirohito’s “Humanity 
Declaration” delivered on New Year’s Day of 1946.79 From the statement it contained 
calling for the abolition of “the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the 
Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world,” we see 
another foundation of that same porous-boundary-like expectation materialize. 
Contrasting the intent of the Humanity Declaration with the fact that the U.S. had 
spared the Emperor from being tried for any crimes at the Tokyo Trial helps pinpoint 
exactly what memory space was erased as a result of these actions; the safe space for 
the creation of a cohesive Post-War Japanese national identity and memory.  
                                                
78 Shinto-shirei 神道指令, “The Shinto Directive.” Published by Nanzan University, Contemporary 
Religions in Japan 1, no. 2 (June 1960): 85-89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/30232810 
79 Ningen-sengen 人間宣言, or “Imperial Rescript on the Construction of a New Japan” Shin Nippon 
Kensetsu ni Kan suru Shōsho 新日本建設に関する詔書 
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 In other words, the individualization of responsibility at the Tokyo Trial onto 
those deemed Class-A, -B, and -C war criminals contrasted with the innocence of the 
now non-divine Emperor blurred out how the people should make sense of their own 
postwar feelings and memories—there was no space to accept being both a victim of 
Imperialism and an aggressor that had once wielded it. That, added to the fact that the 
East and Southeast Asian “other” victims of the Asia-Pacific War were left by the 
Tokyo Trial without even a right to have an identity, is what allowed for the continued 
unscrupulous collection of war memories and control of unwilling transnational bodies 
at Yasukuni the site.  
Yasukuni the Silence 
 To broaden the discussion of the three “Yasukuni,” to four, I will touch on my 
most recent visit to observe the shrine grounds and the Yushukan Museum. The photo 
below, which I casually took on Thursday, June 28, 2018 at just past 2:00pm, caught 
my attention later that night. Upon realizing that it was neither a holiday, nor lunch-
time, I was surprised at the number of people present in front of the main shrine. I 
stood to watch for a long while 
(possibly looking lost), and the silence 
all around was almost tangible. 
Visitors did not greet or even 
acknowledge each other after paying 
their respects, and each visitor only 
stayed for a few minutes. Unlike almost everywhere else I had visited during this 
research trip, no friendly and helpful guide approached me to offer information, 
pamphlets, or enquire about my activity.  
 I spent three hours in the Yushukan Museum (just up the walkway to the left) 
each day from Wednesday to Friday, each visit at a different time of day, and I crossed 
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the paths of only 4 other parties during that time. When I spoke to a staff member at 
the information desk about taking pictures of certain exhibits, I mentioned that I was 
surprised at how quiet it was. She kindly replied that it does tend to be quiet at the 
museum, but that it would probably be more lively the following Monday as a field 
trip for a nearby elementary school was scheduled. 
 Other than the unexpected quiet, the museum exhibits remain exactly as 
Herbert Bix described them in his book; one could enter and exit the museum having 
viewed all its contents and never draw the conclusion that Emperor Hirohito had 
played a significant role in the war.80 The naming and description of events like “the 
Manchurian Incident” and “the Mukden Incident” follow the revisionist stance, and 
the stories of foreign others are generally absent. The emphasis on the suffering of 
women on the homefront, and the sacrifices made for the nation were abound, much 
the same as at the Tokyo Showakan. Near the exit to the final exhibit were several 
large books for visitors to write their parting thoughts. Most entries were scrawled in 
children’s handwriting and expressed awe at the bravery of the soldiers or happiness 
that they can live in a much better Japan. The lengthier notes, presumably written by 
university students or other adults, expressed a much wider array of opinions.  
 Overall, this experience of silence at Yasukuni, as well as the relative quiet of 
the other museums I visited in Japan that summer, made me wonder what the status of 
the mourning and memory process is for the people who visit these sites now. 
Although I cannot say for sure, it seemed that the expression of personal, deeper 
thoughts on matters of the war are still kept very private, and that Japan still lacks a 
public environment conducive to critiquing the carefully constructed images of 
Japan’s past. 
                                                
80 Bix, p. 683 
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 It is at the cost of silencing those foreign others’ stories, memories, and worries 
that Japan may bring to light their own. Unfortunately, the “Yasukuni Conundrum” is 
but one venue through which influential Japanese public figures portray dissatisfaction 
with Japan’s postwar status and fractured national identity. A socio-political wave by 
the name of revisionism is another venue through which Japanese organizations 
sustain victimization in the popular conscious, habituate silence in resolving matters of 
their own past aggressions, and attempt to spackle over the walls of history wherever 
an unsightly stain appears.   
 
Constitutional & Historical Revisionism 
 As noted above, Post-War Allied expectations drove a vanquished but still 
defensive Japanese government to seek outlets for their tumultuous feelings of loss 
and anger. In addition to voicing informal but still state-sponsored displeasure through 
Yasukuni the issue, constitutional revisionism can be seen as its formal counterpart. 
To acknowledge the current realities of Japan’s postwar constitution81 and why it 
sparks such desire in some groups to pursue drastic revision means to acknowledge the 
uncomfortable nature of its creation.  
 The “Committee to Study Constitutional Problems” was a group established in 
1946 by order of the SCAP and was headed by Japanese legal scholar and prewar 
cabinet minister Joji Matsumoto. Although General MacArthur had hoped for the 
Japanese side to initiate democratic reforms of their own volition so as to avoid 
international criticism, the draft constitution eventually proposed by Matsumoto’s 
team was quickly rejected outright. Citing that the Japanese draft lacked significant 
changes when compared to the original Meiji Constitution, the SCAP ordered his own 
                                                
81 Full-text of the Constitution of Japan available at: 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html 
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staff, headed by Major General Courtney Whitney, to draft a new document, including 
an article totally renouncing war. Created in less than one week, the new draft was 
presented to the Japanese side in February 1947 under threat that “the person of the 
Emperor could not be guaranteed” should they refuse to proclaim it.82  
 Through the reluctant acceptance of the U.S. version of the document, the 
country of Japan was forcibly democratized, demilitarized, and expressly forbidden 
from ever possessing war potential again.83 Since the end of the U.S. Occupation, the 
constitution has never been subject to formal amendment. But in recent years, we are 
now witnessing repeated attempts by Prime Ministers (Abe Shinzo only being the 
most recent of these) and their cabinet members to revise, or at least drastically re-
interpret, the constitution. With much of the fire aimed at Article 984 we can view this 
revisionist wave as a reminder that the embers of the Asia-Pacific War, the Tokyo 
Trial, and the U.S. Occupation are still burning memory spaces refusing to be silenced 
or forgotten. 
 While formerly exploited neighbors like the Koreas and China may have been 
fairly content with the creation of Japan’s constitution, which seemed would shield 
them indefinitely from worries of attempted re-colonization and military belligerence, 
Japanese leaders today feel strongly that after spending more than 70 years’ time on 
creating a new track record as a peaceful country, it is high time to regain the status 
and rights of a normalized country. Never forgetting the memory of the victor’s justice 
                                                
82 Yongwook Ryu, 2018. pp. 4-5 
83 Interpretations of “war potential” have varied from administration to administration, but a general 
logic seems to be that anything in excess of purely self-defensive capabilities is to be considered “war 
potential.” See Hisako Motoyama, “Formulating Japan’s UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan.” 2018. 
84 Chapter II: Renunciation of War, Article 9. “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. 
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”  
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that was exacted upon the Japanese people at the end of the Asia Pacific War, it is in 
this environment that the two major claims for constitutional revision have been 
legitimated by a variety of Japanese politicians and organizations.  
 The first claim is that such an “imposed” and “un-Japanese” constitution 
renders it impossible for the Japanese people to feel pride in being Japanese. The 
adjacent issue of history revisionism, in which Japanese school textbooks and other 
print media glorify, water down, or even delete certain events of Japan’s wartime 
endeavors, bolsters this claim. Like some who insist that the Holocaust was a hoax, 
their Japanese counterparts try to downplay events like the Rape of Nanking, and 
claim that the stories like those of the “comfort women” are a fabrication, among other 
things. Historian Ienaga Saburō, famous for his life-long work of holding school 
textbook creators accountable for accurate representation of Japan’s wartime past, puts 
it this way: 
 
If postwar prosperity came at the expense of the war, those who are 
able to enjoy this (including the postwar generations) should be 
willing to take responsibility for the war.85  
 A boom of international news coverage regarding this issue is largely 
responsible for the critique that Japanese leaders engage in a contradictory back-and-
forth of a “politics of regret” followed by periods of “historical amnesia,” all while 
proclaiming to be invested in upholding the ideal of international peace and continuing 
prosperity. This leads to the second claim, which is that current perceived regional 
security threats, particularly the nuclear weapons and missile threat posed by North 
Korea and the belligerent nature of territorial disputes namely with China, cannot be 
dealt with sufficiently due to constitutional restrictions.  
                                                
85 Saburo Ienaga, “The Glorification of War in Japanese Education.” International Security 18, no. 3 
(Winter 1993): 113-133. 
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 Most visible of all such revisionist attempts are those by Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzo. During his first term in office from 2006-2007, Abe passed the National 
Referendum Law, which appeared to be the first step toward lowering the bar to 
official constitutional change. As Article 96 states, any proposed amendments should 
be initiated by the Diet, then voted on by all the members of each House. Should it 
pass by a two-thirds majority, the proposed amendment would then be left to the 
people’s vote through a special referendum with requirements to be determined by the 
Diet.86 The National Referendum Law is notable in that it specified passing by only a 
bare majority would be the requirement, not a two-thirds majority as in the House.87 
 Then, shortly after his re-election in 2012, Abe quickly began with efforts to 
revise Article 96 itself. Although this was met with insurmountable opposition, his 
revisionist efforts did not stop there. By July 2014 his cabinet announced their pursuit 
of a new policy of “collective self-defense.” This policy would re-interpret Article 9’s 
second paragraph to allow for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces88 to participate in foreign 
conflicts for the purpose of providing “collective self-defense” alongside their allies. 
This legislation was passed on September 19, 2015 and became fully effective from 
March 29, 2016.89 While Abe has not yet technically achieved a formal revision of the 
content of the constitution, his re-interpretation is a major political move that was 
ultimately just as powerful.  
                                                
86 “Article 96. Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote 
of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people 
for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a 
special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify. 
Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the 
people, as an integral part of this Constitution.”  
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html 
87 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/21/abe-and-constitutional-revision-round-two/ 
88 The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are a creation of the Cold-War era during which Japan became 
entangled in US-led anti-communist regional military strategy. See Hisako Motoyama, 2018. 
89 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34287362 
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 This legislation proved very unsettling in the eyes of neighboring countries like 
South Korea and China who had long enjoyed that particular sense of security 
provided by Japan’s longstanding pacifist constitutional interpretation. And as the 
record of Abe’s nationalist pubic remarks and legislative actions grows ever larger, the 
space in which to acknowledge the origins of that nationalist anger threatens to shrink. 
Without doing injustice to the memories of those who suffered at the hands of the 
Imperial Japanese forces, there must also be acknowledgement from global citizens 
that at the end of the war, the Japanese people were made to experience a few 
injustices of their own.  
 While the more peace-loving and truth-seeking among us may rightly feel very 
averse to things like Abe denouncing the 1993 Kono Statement90 and the claims of the 
former “comfort women” and his pro-revisionist stance on history textbooks, it would 
still be hypocritical to refuse to acknowledge that in some ways, Japanese people were 
not given a voice either at the end of the Asia Pacific War. In a similar vein, Japan’s 
tormented national identity in light of the individualization of war responsibility at the 
Tokyo Trial is further complicated by the elder generation’s self-imposed silence. 
Even though those very people may now feel upset to hear of the plight of such 
“foreign other” victims like the “comfort women” and former forced laborers, and 
may have grown to take great pride in Japan’s pacifist constitution as a step in the 
right direction, to readdress history in any way risks the potential de-individualization 
of guilt for wartime events. That would force them to come to terms with their long 
suppressed guilty conscious of having once lived as pro-war supporters. This in turn 
instigates taboo and a sort of apathetic habitual silence in the general Japanese public 
around revisiting the more unsavory matters of history.  
 
                                                
90 The 1993 Kono Statement is available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html 
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CONCLUSION 
 Though I hardly feel that I have said enough on these matters of postwar 
habitual silence, by now at least my initial two points should have been validated. 
Through the discussion of the Tokyo Trial and its failure to fulfill the legacy imagined 
at Nuremberg, we see that regional specificities and cultural practices are integral 
factors that cannot be ignored in the pursuit of post-conflict peace-building. The 
outcomes of the Tokyo Trial have transcended generations and are still eating away at 
the Japanese sense of national identity as well as their ability to vocalize and come to 
terms with aggressions committed in the past. The trial also foreclosed the possibility 
of open postwar redress efforts when transnational bodies such as those of the comfort 
women and of other forced laborers were completely ignored in the proceedings. 
Despite some eventually breaking the silence of their suffering and officially bringing 
their cases before their oppressors, the long passage of time had rendered their 
memories suspect, and subjected them to the Japanese legal system’s long embedded 
attitudes of gendered violence and the limits of international law. 
 In discussing the complexities of the Yasukuni Shrine Conundrum, we could 
see numerous instances of political expediency taking precedence over the well-being 
of individuals. The silencing of Japanese citizens who may have disagreed with the 
Asia-Pacific War was achieved through the government’s repurposing of the concept 
of eirei and the aestheticization of war death. The mutual surveillance between 
families who both had and had not lost loved ones forced everyone to show respect for 
sacrifices no one should have to make, and erased citizens’ ability to mourn freely. For 
those who had supported the war effort, the shock of the Emperor’s unconditional 
surrender and the ensuing U.S. Occupation status would force them into silence as 
well. In order to rebuild a Japan that could be respected again in the world, war 
responsibility was individualized onto a select few, Emperor Hirohito was exempted 
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from judgment, and the general public was left with little direction, which resulted in 
their passive adoption of his innocence as their own.  
 Over the seven postwar decades, Japanese politicians have sought a return to 
normalized sovereignty, and opposition to the imposed peace constitution is gaining 
traction. The wave of constitutional revisionism in Japan is just one part of the wider 
movement of historical revisionism that has been brewing as a result of that adopted 
sense of postwar innocence and victimization at the hands of U.S. Imperialism. The 
truth that Japanese people were not given a voice on certain occasions at the close of 
the Asia-Pacific War thus complicates the regional politics that constantly place 
nationally bounded victim narratives in competition with each other. Gendered and 
nationalist traditions are certainly not unique to Japan, but the uncomfortable truths 
and complexities of history tend to keep the volume up for some groups while toning 
down the details of others. 
 Attempted erasures of memory space have been committed to varying degrees 
by all parties involved in commemoration practices related to the Asia-Pacific War. 
Thus it is for that reason that we should now look to the perspectives of those silenced, 
rather than those already well recorded, in assessing the aftermath of the Asia-Pacific 
War’s transnational violence. Making porous the boundaries of our understanding of 
collective memories while asking the hard questions about history will be just one way 
to pay for the prosperity many now have. Although the 20th century was a truly 
unfortunate time, it does not cry for revision. Instead it calls for dedicated and 
repeated re-evaluations by those who can wield both critical thinking and compassion. 
The least we can do from now on is refuse to let habitual silences continue to spackle 
over our memories. 
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